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Abstract
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model.  He uses  data from  1987-2000  oil  4 1 African  entry. The introductioll  of digital  techlinology  has a
countries that have adopted  ceilular telecommunlications  positive  and  significanit  effect on  the  diffusion of  iiiobile
techiologies.  He  fmiids that competitioni  is the  driving  phonies. The presence  of an  incubnient-owned  cellilar
force behind the  mobile telecommuiluicationis  explosioil  in  operator  hlas  a negative  effect on the  diffusion of
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3I. Introduction
Technological  changes  have  weakened  the  long-held  argument  of economies  of
scale  and  scope  that  favor  a  natural  monopoly  for  the  telecommunications  industry.
Therefore,  competitive  provision of telecommunications  services  has become  a common
phenomenon throughout the world, including Africa. Telecommunications  competition in
Africa  has been seen primarily in the cellular  segment of the industry,  and rapid service
expansions  have  been  observed  in  many  countries.  For  example,  the  average  annual
cellular expansion  rate in Africa  increased  from 60  percent in the  mid-90s  to more than
100  percent  in,2000  (ITU).'  What  determines  the  growth  of mobile  connections  in
Africa?  It  is'important  because  mobile  technology  growth  has  outpaced  fixed  wire
growth in many countries in Africa, and yet is not the main source of telecommunications
service  for  many  people.  A  number  of factors  can  explain  this  growth,  including  the
traditional  ones,  such  as  long waiting-time  for  fixed  line connections  and overall dismal
performance  of the fixed telecommunications  network.  However,  we have not seen  any
systematic  explanation  of this  phenomenon  in  a  developing  country  context  although
various  case  studies  and  anecdotal  evidence  have  recently  appeared.  This  study,
therefore,  tries to fill this gap  by econometrically  identifying the deterninants  of mobile
telecommunications  diffusion/expansion  using African data.
Despite the  lack  of empirical evidence  in a  developing  country  context,  there is
some  evidence  of mobile  diffusion  from  emerging  and  developed  economies.  Gruber
(2001)  analyzed  the diffusion  of mobiles  in Central and Eastern  Europe using  a logistic
fixed-effects  model,  and  found  that  the  speed  of mobile  diffusion  increases  with  the
number of firms,  the  size of the fixed telecommunications  network  and the length of the
waiting list.  In  the  same study, he  also  found that simultaneous  entry is more  effective
than  sequential  entry  in  accelerating  the  speed  of  diffusion  of  mobiles.  Gruber  &
Verboven  (2000)  also  analyzed  the  evolution  of  the  global  mobile  communications
industry  using  the  same logistic  fixed-effects  model,  and  found  that timing  of the  first
entry,  competition  and mode  of the  second  cellular  entry are  the major determinants  of
'Growth  calculated by the author using ITU data.
4the  speed of mobile  diffusions.  They also  found  that income  (as measured  by GDP per
capita), main lines and the waiting list have significant positive impact on the diffusion  of
mobiles.
Furthermore,  Gruber  &  Verboven  (1999)  studied  the  diffusion  of  mobile
telecommunications  in the EU using the same model, and  reported that digitalization and
competition  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  diffusion  of mobiles  in  the  EU  with  the
former  having  a  lot  more  impact  than  the  latter.  They  also  reported  that  main  line
penetration  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  speed  of mobile  diffusion,  suggesting  that
mobiles  are  substitutes  for  fixed lines.  While  digitalization  is  an  important  explanatory
factor  in  the  EU  study,  it  is  not  significant  in  either  the  CEE  or  the  global  mobile
industry studies.  The three studies also report  divergent results on mode of entry and the
size  of the  fixed  network;  however,  they  all  agree  on  the  fact  that  competition  has  a
substantial  impact on  the  growth  of mobiles.  This  study  aims,  therefore,  to  shed  some
light on the issue and help resolve the observed anomalies.
This study is of interest to policy makers  because of the important  link between
telecommunications  penetration  and  economic  growth.  Growth  in  telecommunications
penetration  is positively  associated  with  economic  development.  Norton  (1992),  using
data from 47 countries  for the period  1947 to 1977  and controlling  for the initial  stage of
the  level of telecom  development  and  a number of macroeconomic  variables,  finds  that
telecommunications  has  positive  and  significant  impact  on  economic  growth,  and
concludes  that  the  existence  of a telecommunications  infrastructure  reduces  transaction
costs  since  output  rises  when  the  infrastructure  is  present.  Moreover,  Roller  and
Waverman (2001) found a causal relationship  between telecommunications  infrastructure
and aggregate  output  using OECD  data  for the period  1970 to  1990 after accounting  for
simultaneity  and  country-specific  fixed  effects.  Appreciating  this  important  link,
multinational  institutions,  including  the  World  Bank,  have  been  showing  increasing
interest  in  issues  of finding  better  ways of providing  telecommunications  services  and
increasing penetration  (World Bank,  1994).
5The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  section  2  discusses  telecommunications  in
Africa,  and section 3 describes the data and their sources.  Section 4 explains  the model
and section 5 presents the results. Finally, a concluding remark will follow.
6II. Telecommunications  in Africa
Telecommunications  in Africa, mainly fixed line services, can be characterized by
low penetration,  poor quality,  and unreliability.  For example,  Africa,  excluding  South
Africa,  had only  1.82 main  lines per  100 population  in  1999 while East Asia had  8.23
main  lines per  100 population  in  the  same year  and  Latin America  and  the Caribbean
(LAC) had 13.21 main lines per 100 population that year (Fig.  1).  The situation was even
worse in sub-Saharan  Africa where telecommunications  penetration was about 0.64 main
lines per 100 population in the same  year. The International  Telecommunications  Union
(ITU)  identified  the  following  as  the  main  reasons  for  the  underdevelopment  of
telecommunications  in Africa:  (1)  lack of investment,  (2) investment  inefficiencies,  (3)
inadequate  private  sector  involvement,  (4)  foreign  exchange  scarcity,  (5)  poor
management  incentives  and  (6)  insufficient  regional  development  (ITU  1994).
Recognizing  this  reality  and  pressured  by  technological  changes  and  donors,  most
African  countries  started  reforming  their  government-dominated  and  monopoly-based
telecommunications  sector beginning the mid-90s.
Therefore,  by  2001,  about  17  African  countries  had  already  privatized  their
incumbent  fixed-line  operator  and more  were in the process of doing so, two countries
had  allowed  competition  in basic  services,  and  more  than  36  countries  had  created  a
separate  regulatory  body  for  the  telecommunications  sector.  Moreover,  about  45
countries  have  licensed private  cellular  operators  and  effective  cellular  competition  has
now  emerged  in many  countries  in the  region.  Almost  all  African countries  have  now
introduced  some kind of reforms in their telecommunications  sector, and are at different
stages of the reform process.
7Figure 1: Main Lines Per 100 Population
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Cellular  in Africa
Although the adoption of wireless telecommunications  has been feasible  since the
late  1970s, it reached the African public mainly during the 1  990s.2 The introduction of
cellular telecommunications  in Africa disrupted the monopoly then enjoyed by African
incumbent operators and for the first time opened access for private entrepreneurs  to
enter the telecommunications  sector in Africa. By 2001, more than 90% of African
countries had already adopted cellular telecommunications  technologies compared  to just
18% in 1993.
In Africa, private operators have pioneered the development of cellular networks,
and the incumbent fixed-line operators seem to have a relatively modest role.  For
example, of the total of 110 cellular operators in the year 2001, 60 percent were  fully
owned by private investors and 28 percent were joint ventures between private investors
and the incumbent, and only 12 percent were full subsidiaries of the incumbent fixed-line
operator (Figure 2).
2 This is except South Africa, Algeria,  Egypt, Morocco,  Tunisia,  Congo (DR) and Mauritius which have




Source:  African  Telecommunicanons  Research  Project, World  Bank
The  leaders  of  the  mobile  miracle  in  Africa  not  only  are  private  in  their
ownership,  but also are pan-African  and indigenous despite the presence of a number of
foreign  multinational  carriers  operating  in different parts of the region.  Mobile  Systems
International  (MSI),  MTN  of South  Africa  and  Orascom  of Egypt  are  some  of  the
indigenous  pan-African  operators.  MSI  was  founded  in  1998  by  a  Sudanese  mobile
communications  expert,  and  it  now  holds  mobile  licenses  in  more  than  14  African
countries  serving a population  of over 250 million.  Similarly,  Orascom  of Egypt, which
was founded by an Egyptian entrepreneur, operates  in more than 14 African countries  and
it  is  aggressively  expanding  in  the  region.3 Likewise,  Mobile  Telecommunications
Networks  (MTN),  which  is  based  in  South  Africa  and  owned  by  South  Africans,  has
already expanded  its service coverage to other five African countries,  including Uganda,
Swaziland,  Rwanda,  Cameroon  and  Nigeria.  Other  indigenous  operators  are  also
becoming  pan-African  and are  increasing  their market  presence  and  level of operations
4
taking advantage of the changing telecom environment  in the region.
3 See www.msi-cellular.com  and www.orascomtelecom.com  for further information.
4 Econet Wireless  of Zimbabwe,  which is owned by a Zimbabwean businessman, can be a good example.
9Cellular  Market Structure & Competition
Most  of the  cellular  markets  in  Africa  are  competitive  although  the  level  of
competition  differs from country to country.  About 44% of the African cellular markets
have two operators,  30% have three or more operators,  and only 26% of the markets  are
monopoly.5 Africa has seen cellular competition in markets as small as Seychelles, which
has a population of only 76,000.  Competition in these small markets has helped disprove
the idea that market size is a serious constraint to competition.
The tendency  in Africa  is to  issue nationwide  licenses  although  some countries
initially tried  geographic-based  licensing.  Generally,  cellular operators  compete head-to-
head against each other and the incumbent for local and long-distance  traffic.  As a result
of the  growing  competition,  the cellular  market  in Africa  is being  rapidly transformed.
For example,  cellular services which were limited to capital cities until recently can now
be  found  in  areas  hundreds  of miles  away  from  the  capital  as  operators  compete  for
coverage.  Almost  all operators  that started services using analog  technologies  have now
migrated  to digital  technologies  which  allow  for  more customers  to  be  served  with the
same amount of spectrum.  The increasing  shift from postpaid to prepaid  services, which
has led to  rapid mobile use in  the region, can  also be attributed  to the growing  cellular
competition.
Cellular competition in most parts of Africa came  later than the cellular services.
For  instance,  more than  80% of the  competitive  entries  in the  region were  introduced
sequentially  over  an  average  period  of 5.44  years  (Table  4).  This  is  not  a surprising
phenomenon  as most African  governments  and several  investors doubted the feasibility
of telecommunications  competition until recently.  However,  simultaneous  entry has made
headway  in  the  region  as  governments  increasingly  appreciate  the  value  of cellular
competition.
5 Source:  African Cellular Operators Database, African Telecommunications  Research Project, World Bank
10Cellular  Penetration
The  growth  of  mobile  penetration  in  Africa  has  been  impressive.  Cellular
penetration  had  already  surpassed  fixed  line penetration  over half the  continent by the
end of 2001.  Some countries,  such as Gabon and Uganda,  have seen their cellular system
grow to more than three times of the size of their fixed line network.  Almost all countries
with  more  cellular  than  fixed,  except  Swaziland,  have  competitive  cellular  markets.
Cellular penetration  in Africa varies  not only by market structure,  but also by region.  In
2000,  for  example,  South  Africa  had  19.79  cellular  phones  per  100  population  while
North  Africa had 2.79  cellular  phones  per 100 population  and sub-Saharan  Africa had
only  0.56  cellular  phones  per  100  population  (Figure  3).  Smaller countries,  such  as
Reunion and Seychelles,  have already achieved as much as 50% penetration.
Figure 3: Cellular Subscribers per 100 Population in Africa
(South  Africa right scale)
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11Cellular  Technologies in Africa
A number of analog and digital systems have been tried in Africa.  The Global
System of Mobile Communications (GSM) standard  is the leading technology, and has
seen wider application in the region,  followed by AMPS and TACS.  Almost  all entrants
during the last five or six years have been deploying the GSM standard,  and earlier
entrants which started with other technologies  have also been migrating to this digital
system. The penetration of the US digital systems, such as DAMPS and CDMA that have
better spectral efficiency than GSM, is still very low.  The GSM standard is emerging as a
default digital standard in Africa.  This standard is about 4 times more efficient in its
spectrum usage than most efficient analog systems, and hence has that much higher
connection capacity  (see Gruber and Verboven 2000). 6 GSM networks currently account
for more than 95% of the total mobile subscribers in the region, which  is high compared
to 70% in the world.7 The region is likely to be fully digitalized  in the very near future if
the current trend of digitalization  continues.
Table 1: Cellular Networks  in Africa  120011
Digital  Analog
Type  Developer  Number  Type  Developer  Number
GSM900  Europe  85  AMPS  USA  II
DECT/WiLL  Various  7  TACS  UK  4
GSM1 800  Europe  5  E-TACS800  UK  2
CDMA  USA  3  NMT-450  Scandinavian  2
D-AMPS  USA  I  NMT-900  Scandinavian  1




N-AMPS  USA  I
Total  102  Total  2
Source:  www.cellular.co.za/african-standards.htm,  Access  date 01/23/2002
6 Digital systems in general are 3 to 6 times more efficient  than analog  systems depending on the type of
technologies  (see Gruber and Verboven,  2000).
7See www.cellular.co.za,  access  date 01/23/2002
12III.  The Data
The sample  contains information  on 41  African  countries  for the period  1987  to
2000.  Four of the  sample  countries  are  from  North  Africa  and  the rest  are  from  sub-
Saharan  Africa,  including  South  Africa.  Cellular  services  are  available  in  all  of our
sample countries  although  service was introduced  at different times.  The dataset includes
information  on  entry,  competition,  technology,  regulation,  the  number  of  cellular
subscribers, main lines, GDP per capita, population and % of urbanization.
The data comes from different sources.  The cellular and fixed line subscriber data
comes  from  International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU)  database,  and  the  GDP,
population  and  urbanization  figures  come  from  the  World  Bank  SIMA  database.  The
qualitative  variables  come  from  a  combination  of sources,  such  as  EMC  publications,
Economist  Intelligence  Unit  (EIU)  publications,  and  http://www.cellular.co.za.  Almost
complete data, with very few exceptions, is available  for all periods and countries.
13IV.  The Methodology
I estimate the deterninants  of cellular diffusion using a fixed-effects model
controlling for different country characteristics.  I also control for the effects of time using
a non-linear time trend.  First, I estimate equation (1) which simply defines the
competition variable  as the number of cellular operators to see the overall effects of
competition, technological change, regulation and incumbent-owned  cellular on mobile
diffusion.
yia  = ai+ /31(ncel l)  + /32(regi) + /33(ioci)  + /4(prva)  + S(dig ,)  (1)
+ 9 (X,,)  + &,
Equation (1)  uses a very general definition of competition.  This specification
doesn't capture the growth rate differences  among the different market structures,  nor
does it capture the effects of having a separate sector regulator across the different
markets.  Therefore,  I  further refine the competition variable in equation (2) by
segregating the markets into different market structures, such as monopoly,  duopoly, and
triopoly markets.  Also, I introduce interaction terms between regulation and the market-
structure dummies to see how different markets perform when interacted with regulation.
Therefore,  I estimate equation (2) with this refinement which will enable us to test
various hypotheses,  including whether there are significant growth variations  among
different market structures,  and whether the effectiveness  of regulation ( or having a
separate telecom regulator) varies across different market structures.  I will run  equation
(2) by dropping one of the market structure dummies alternatively to identify the relative
significance of the included market structures as compared to the excluded one.
y=  a,  + /3i(som  n) + 132(dom ,)  + /33(tom ,)  + /34(som  It* reg  i)  + /3s(dom  it * rega)
+ /3 6(tom  it * reg  s)  +  3 7(reg,,)  + ,8(i  C(  i,,) + /39( pr  i)  + /3 io(prv  ,  * ioc a )  (2)
+ ¢(digit) + y(cme  ,) + 
9 (x,t)  +  ie
Yjt  is the  logarithm of total cellular subscribers  in country i at time t.  It includes
both prepaid and postpaid subscribers.  This variable is the main  explainable  variable for
which we  are trying to unravel the determinants of its diffusion.
14Ncelit is  the nunber of cellular operators in country i at time t.  As the number of
cellular operators increases, available capacity and the intensity of competition is
expected  to rise, resulting in different competitive behaviors,  such as price cuts, quality
improvements,  expansion of coverage.  This leads to an increase in the number of people
adopting cellular, and hence the variable is expected to be positively correlated with
mobile growth.
Regit is a dummy variable  that captures  the presence of a separate regulator in
country i at time t.  Therefore,  this variable becomes one as soon as the country
introduces a separate regulator for the telecommunications  sector, and zero otherwise.
A separate regulator is a specialized body that oversees the activities of all
telecommunications  sector players, and seems to be different, at least in form, from
previous regulatory regimes, which were dominated by sector ministry and the
incumbent.  This variable  could be positively or negatively correlated with mobile growth
depending on whether the regulator is facilitating competition  or is captured by players in
the market.
Iocit is a dummy variable that becomes  one if country i at time t has  a fully or
partially incumbent-owned  cellular operator,  and zero otherwise.  This variable can be
either positively or negatively correlated with mobile growth depending on whether the
incumbent is able to stifle competition.  The presence of an incumbent-owned  cellular in
a competitive market could slow down the growth of mobiles if the incumbent  abuses its
dominant position.
Prvit is a dummy variable that becomes  one when the incumbent operator in
country  i at time t is privatized,  and zero otherwise.  This variable is expected  to be either
positively or negatively correlated with mobile growth depending on whether the
privatization  of the incumbent creates a more competitive or stifling environment.
Somi, is a dummy variable that becomes one when the cellular market structure in
country i at time t is a monopoly,  and zero otherwise.
15Domi, is a dummy variable that becomes one when the cellular market structure in
country i at time t is a duopoly,  and zero otherwise.  As market structures change  from a
monopoly to a duopoly, mobile growth rates are expected to rise because of competition.
Therefore, this will lead us to the following testable hypothesis:
fl2  -f1  > 0
If the above hypothesis  holds true, it implies that the coefficient  of the duopoly
dummy is positive and significant when the excluded category is the monopoly dummy
only.
Tom,,  is a dummy variable that becomes one when the cellular market in country i
at time t has three or more operators,  and zero  otherwise.  Also, as the number of cellular
operators rises to three or more, competition is expected  to increase and hence mobile
growth. Therefore,  this will also  lead us to the following testable hypothesis:
P3 - 82  >  0
If the data supports the above hypothesis,  it implies that the coefficient of the
triopoly market dummy is positive and significant when the excluded  category is the
duopoly dummy.  Alternatively,  it also implies that the coefficient of the triopoly dummy
is significantly higher than that of the duopoly dummy when the excluded category is the
monopoly dummy.
Cme1, is a vector of dummy variables for competitive modes of entries, such as
sequential,  simultaneous,  and preemptive.  (1) Sim,,  is a dummy variable that becomes
one as soon as country i at year t introduces a simultaneous  competition,  (2) Seqi, is a
dummy variable that becomes one  as soon as country i at year t introduces  a sequential
competition,  (3) Pre 1, is a dummy variable that becomes one only in the year prior to the
introduction of the first sequential  entry, and zero otherwise.  This variable is expected to
be positively correlated with mobile growth as incumbent mobile operators normally
react to the potential threat of competition from a new entrant,  (4) Seq 1, (0) is a dummy
variable that becomes one only in the year of the introduction of the first sequential entry,
16and zero otherwise,  (5) Seqit (-1) is a one-year lagged sequential competitive entry mode
variable,  and (6) Simit (-1) is a one-year lagged simultaneous competitive  entry mode
variable
a  and  &£  are country specific  fixed-effects  and error terms, respectively.  Xt is a
vector of control variables, including main lines, population, per capita income, and
degree of urbanization.  These control variables are defined as follows: (a) Lnmli, is the
logarithm of total main lines in country i at time t.  A main line,  as per the ITU's
definition,  is a telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment to the
PSTN and has a dedicated port in the telephone exchange  equipment.  This variable can
be positively or negatively correlated with the growth of cellular depending on whether
cellular complements or substitutes fixed line telephony.  (b) Lnpoit is the logarithm  of
total population in country i at time t, and this variable is expected  to be positively
correlated with mobile growth . (c)Lngdp1t  is the logarithm of per capita real gross
domestic product in US dollars of country i at time t, and it is expected to be positively
correlated with mobile growth.  (d) Urbit is the percentage of population living in urban
areas in country i at time t, and it is expected to measure the level of urbanization of a
country.  People living in urban areas are usually considered to have a better income,
standard of living,  and awareness than those living in rural areas, and hence  this variable
is expected to be positively correlated with mobile growth. (e) Trdi, is the square of the
time trend variable to control for time trend taking into account the non-linearity of the
mobile diffusion over time.
17V.  The Results
I present the estimation results of the above fixed-effects mobile growth model in
this section. Table 2 presents the results of equation (1)  and Table 3 presents the results
of equation  (2).  Most of the results are consistent with our expectations.  The competition
variables  in both equations are positive and significant, and all competitive markets grow
faster than monopoly markets; however, no evidence is found to support the hypothesis
that triopoly markets grow faster than duopoly markets.  Triopoly markets, in fact,  grow
slower than duopoly markets when a separate regulator is introduced  in the sector,
suggesting the presence of a regulatory capture as markets become more competitive.  A
separate regulator also tends to decelerate mobile diffusion in both monopoly and
duopoly markets, though the effects are not statistically significant.  Evidence of pre-
emptive behaviors in competitive  sequential entries is also found.  However,  no evidence
is found to support significant differences  between simultaneous and sequential entries.
In sequential  entries, the major effect of competition on mobile growth occurs after the
actual year of entry.
Moreover, privatization of the incumbent  fixed line operator significantly
accelerates  mobile growth while the presence of an incumbent-owned  cellular
significantly slows down the growth of mobiles.  The latter result is consistent with the
theory of the abuse of a dominant position by the dominant operator. As far as technology
is concerned,  digitalization  is positive and significant.  Furthermore, urbanization and
main lines are positive and significant from among the country characteristics  variables
selected for the study.  Income ( measured by real GDP per capita in US$) and
population, which are traditionally perceived to be correlated with mobile growth,  are not
significant.  The insignificance  of the income variable could be partly because of its high
and positive correlation with the main lines variable.  All of the empirical results remain
robust with different specifications of the model.  I will thoroughly discuss the estimation
results in the following sub-sections.
18The effect of competition and regulation
Table 2 presents the results of equation (1)  which defines the competition variable
as number-of-cellular-operators.  The variable is significantly correlated  with mobile
growth, and the result suggests that adding one more mobile operator increases the total
mobile subscribers by about 57 percent on average.  Table 3 presents the results of
equation (2) which defines the competition variable slightly differently by introducing
separate dummy variables  for monopoly, duopoly,  and triopoly markets to test for any
significant differences  in mobile growth among the different market structures.8 The
coefficients of the market structure  dummies, which are reported in column V of Table 3,
suggest that duopoly and triopoly markets grow significantly faster than monopoly
markets; however,  there is no sufficient evidence to support any significant differences in
the speed of  mobile growth between duopoly and triopoly markets. Although the speed of
mobile growth in duopoly markets appears to be higher than that of triopoly markets,  a
Wald test conducted to test for differences between these coefficients  did not find any
significant differences.  When splitting markets merely into competitive  and monopoly,
however, the coefficient of the competitive  market dummy suggests that mobile growth
in a competitive  market in general is about  194 percent higher than that of a monopoly
market.  This effectively means that if a monopoly market  grows by X percent, then a
competitive market grows by 2.94X percent  {=X+1.94X}  (see column I of Table  3). 9
This strongly supports the effectiveness  of competition to speed-up the diffusion of
mobiles.
However,  the introduction of a separate sector regulator in triopoly markets
significantly slows down mobile diffusion.10 As presented in column III of Table 3, the
' Although the triopoly market dummy covers markets with three operators by definition, it also includes
five data points of four operators markets  in Ghana,  Madagascar,  and Tanzania  in our case.  This is because
the number of observations  with four operators markets is so low that it does not justify a separate  dumnmy
variable.
9  Competitive  in this case is defined as the presence of two or more mobile operators  in the market.
exp(l.077)-  1  =  1.94
'° The introduction of a separate regulator also tends to slow down mobile diffusion  in monopoly and
duopoly markets, but the effect is not statistically significant.
19coefficient of the triopoly dummy is not significant when the duopoly dummy and the
interaction terms are excluded, suggesting that mobile growth in triopoly markets is not
different  from that in duopoly markets.  Nevertheless,  when the interaction term between
regulation and the market structure dummy is included in the same specification, the
triopoly coefficient  becomes negative and significant, regulation becomes negative and
significant,  and the interaction term between regulation and the triopoly dummy becomes
positive and significant (see column IV of Table 3).  Therefore,  I conduct the following
joint-coefficient  test in order to determine the joint significance of the three variables
when the interaction term is included:
/,3  + ,!6 +  87 = O  Where  /33  is the coefficient of the triopoly dummy,  /16  is the coefficient
of the interaction  term, and  817  is the  coefficient of  the regulation  variable.
The Chi-square value of the above restriction using a Wald test is significant at 7
percent significance  level, indicating that the coefficients, which add up to negative 0.575
(= -1.098  +  1.057 - 0.534), are jointly significant and are different  from zero.  Therefore,
this suggests that mobile growth in triopoly markets slows down when a separate
regulator is introduced,  further suggesting either the presence of a regulatory capture as
markets become more competitive or the failure of the regulatory bodies to manage the
increasing competition perhaps because of organizational  weaknesses.  The result is
consistent with the numerous anecdotal evidence on the presence of a regulatory capture
and the failure of many regulators to manage the increasing telecommunications
competition in Africa partly because of organizational weaknesses.
This finding is also theoretically plausible because the chances of competition-
related intricacies that could slow down mobile growth increase as the number of
operators increases. 11 The increase in the incidence of these intricacies in turn makes the
regulator more susceptible to regulatory capture by various interest groups, particularly
I  I The competition-related  intricacies  include, but not limited to, access  to bottleneck facilities,
interconnection,  equipment co-location,  numbering plans, spectrum allocations,  and restricted services.
These intricacies  can slow down growth by themselves unless properly handled by an impartial regulator.
20by the incumbent operator that may be interested to abuse its dominant position.
Alternatively,  the regulators may not have the required resources and skills to deal with
the rising competition-related  intricacies as the number of operators increases, resulting
in the slow down of mobile growth as markets become more competitive, i.e. for triopoly
or more markets.
The effect of mode of competitive entry
Equation (2) incorporates  various entry variables to identify the effects, if any, of
different modes of entries,  such as simultaneous or sequential  entries, and the presence  of
pre-emptive  behavior in sequential entries.  The result, as shown in column  VIII of Table
3,  suggests the presence of pre-emptive behavior in competitive sequential entries;
however, no significant differences  are found between  simultaneous  and sequential
entries. The coefficient of the pre-emptive dummy suggests that the incumbent mobile
operator increases  its mobile subscriber size by about 38% in the year just prior to the
actual entry of a second new entrant because of the threat of competition.  This could be
accomplished through substantial price cuts and/or expansion of coverage.  Gruber and
Verboven (2000) also reported the presence of pre-emptive behaviors in sequential
entries in their global mobile communications study.
Furthermore,  the absence of significant differences between simultaneous  and
sequential  entries  seems to be consistent with other findings.  Gruber and Verboven
(2000) reported that sequential entry is more effective  in accelerating  growth than
simultaneous  entry in their global mobile communications  study; however, Gruber (2001)
later found that simultaneous  entry is more effective to speed up mobile diffusion in his
CEE study. Therefore, our finding of the absence of significant differences between
sequential  and simultaneous entries is in a way consistent with the prior inconsistent
findings.  In sequential entries, the major effect of competition occurs after the actual
year of entry.  The coefficients  of the sequential  entry variables suggest that a mobile
market grows, ceteris  paribus, by 0.997 in the year of competitive  sequential  entry, but it
grows by 1.423  after the year of the actual entry (see column VIII of Table 3).
21The effect of technologies
In the technology discussion in section one, it is stated that  digital systems are
more efficient than analog ones by a factor of 3 to 6.  This suggests that digital systems
have less capacity constraint than analogs,  and hence can bring, ceterius  paribus,  faster
mobile growth.  Digitalization in some countries in Africa started well before the
introduction of the GSM technology,  and these early digitalizers started with DAMPS
and CDMA.  Therefore, digitalization here refers to these three technologies although  it
is highly dominated by the GSM standard.
As presented  in both Tables  2 and 3, digitalization is positive and significant in all
specifications.  The coefficient of the digitalization variable suggests that when countries
adopt a digital technology, mobile growth increases by about 66% on average.  This
suggests that countries that adopt a digital technology grow faster than those with other
technologies.  However,  digitalization has mixed effects in other studies.  Gruber and
Verboven (1999)  found digitalization  to be positive and significant in their EU study, but
same authors (2000)  found digitalization to be insignificant in their Global Mobile
Telecommunications  study.  Consistent with the latter finding, Gruber (2001) found
digitalization to be insignificant in his Central and Eastern  European study. Interestingly,
our finding on digitalization is consistent with that found in the EU study which is also
dominated by the GSM standard.
The effect ofprivatization and incumbent-owned cellular
Incumbent  fixed line operators are the dominant players in  African
telecommunications  markets.  Thus, the involvement  of the incumbent in cellular
operations and changes in the management  and ownership of the incumbent, for instance
privatization, that are likely to improve its competitive edge theoretically  affect the
growth of mobiles.  Some argue that allowing the incumbent to have its own cellular in a
competitive market would defeat the very purpose of competition because (1)
competition between un-equals is not likely to bring the expected results, (2) the
22incunbent can easily cross-subsidize between its monopoly and competitive  services to
force cellular competitors  out of the market,  and (3) the incumbent can discriminate
between its cellular subsidiary and competitors in providing access to bottleneck
facilities.
The discrimination in the third argument can take different forms, such as
discrimination  in the quality of the point of interconnections,  in the prices of
interconnections,  and refusal to co-locate equipment that could potentially drive the
investment and operational  costs of competitors.  The weakness or absence of
telecommunications  regulators in Africa further strengthens the validity of this argument.
On the other hand, privatization  gives incumbent operators better incentives to improve
performance,  but it could also further strengthen the incumbent to better exploit available
opportunities through the above potential discriminatory practices.  Therefore,  the effect
of privatization on mobile growth could be either positive or negative while the presence
of an incumbent-owned  cellular is expected to slow down mobile growth.
Consistent with our expectation,  the presence of an incumbent-owned cellular is
negatively correlated with mobile growth in both equations (1) and (2) while privatization
of the incumbent is  positively correlated with mobile growth in both equations.  This
suggests that the presence of an incumbent-owned cellular in a mobile market
significantly slows down mobile growth while the privatization of an incumbent operator
accelerates it. The negative effect of an incumbent-owned  cellular on mobile growth
suggests the presence of an abuse of a dominant position by incumbent fixed-line
operators.  In competitive markets, the abuse of a dominant position could take the form
of subtle denials of bottleneck  facilities and subsidization of competitive services to stifle
competition as discussed above.  In monopoly markets, however, the abuse could take the
forn  of investment inefficiency and under investment.  It should be remembered here that
incumbent fixed-line operators in Africa in general have a very dismal record in the
provision of  telecommunications  services,  and most still suffer from rampant
inefficiencies.
23Furthermore, I introduce an interaction term between the incumbent-owned
cellular dummy and the privatization dummy in order to better understand the effect of
these variables when interacted.  When the interaction term is included, the coefficient of
the incumbent-owned  cellular dummy remains  negative and significant, the interaction
term becomes positive and significant while the privatization  dummy becomes
insignificant (see column VIII of Table 3). This suggests that the positive effect of
privatization comes not just simply from privatization of the incumbent fixed-line
operator, but rather from privatization of the incumbent fixed-line operator that is
involved in cellular.  Overall, the results suggest  that the negative effect of having an
incumbent-owned cellular in the market can be mitigated through privatization.  This is
also consistent with the conventional wisdom that privatization  improves performance.
The effect of country characteristics
Country characteristics  variables, such as income, population, urbanization  and
main lines, are included in both equations  and all specifications  as presented in Tables  2
and 3.  From among these country characteristics variables,  urbanization and main lines
are positive and significant while income  (as measured by GDP per capita)  and
population are not significant.  12  The fact that urbanization is positive and significant
suggests that the diffusion of mobiles  is mainly concentrated  in urban centers,  and hence
highly urbanized countries  grow faster.  This looks fairly reasonable  as people living in
urban centers are believed to have a better income, standard of living, and a higher
propensity to adopt new technologies.  Regarding main lines, its positive  significance
suggests that mobiles complement  fixed line networks, further suggesting that mobiles
are mainly getting into the hands of people who already have some form of access to the
fixed network.  The positive significance of main lines could also be due to positive
network externalities  from the fixed network that is that mobile becomes more attractive
12 The coefficients of the main lines and GDP per capita  variables should be interpreted with some caution
as the two are highly positively correlated.  The correlation of these two variables in our data is about 0.94;
therefore,  the insignificance of income in our study could be because of the mnain lines variable.  It is
interesting  to note that both become  significant  when they are run separately (see Columns IX and X of
Table 3).
24than before with the expansion of the fixed network because of the possibility of calling
more people.  In general, the coefficients of the urbanization  and main lines variables are
consistent with each other and both indicate that mobiles are following the footsteps of
the incumbent fixed-line operators which don't have much presence in rural areas.
Other authors reported mixed findings on the effect of main lines and income on
mobile growth.  Gruber and Verboven (2000) reported positive and significant  coefficient
for both income and main lines in their global mobile communications  study; however,
same authors (1999)  found main lines to be negative and significant and income to be
positive and significant in their EU study.  In another study, Gruber (2001)  found main
lines to be positive and significant and income to be insignificant in his study of the
diffusion of mobiles in Central and Eastern Europe.  These findings suggest that mobiles
are perceived  as substitutes  for fixed lines in developed markets,  such as the EU, while
they are perceived as complements  to fixed lines in relatively less developed markets,
such as Central and Eastern Europe. The coefficient of the main lines parameter in our
study is also consistent with this categorization.
VI.  Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the determinants of mobile telecommunications  diffusion
in Africa in a fixed-effects model.  The determinants of mobile diffusion that this study
has identified can be categorized into six major themes, including competition,
regulation, technological  change,  privatization, and the presence of an incumbent-owned
cellular.  Policy differences in relation to these themes affected the diffusion of mobile
telecommunications  in Africa quite differently, explaining the mobile growth variations
among countries in the region.
First, mobile competition (as measured by the number of cellular operators) is
positive and significant,  and the result suggests that mobile subscribers increase by about
57 percent  as an additional operator enters the market.  Both triopoly and duopoly
markets grow faster than monopoly markets; however, no evidence is found to support
significant mobile growth differences between duopoly and triopoly markets. Triopoly
25markets, in fact, grow slower than duopoly markets when a separate regulator is
introduced, suggesting either the presence  of a regulatory capture as the number of
operators increases or the failure of the regulators to manage the increasing  competition
as markets become more competitive.  The latter could be because of lack of the required
resources and skills by the so-called separate regulators to deal with the rising
competition-related intricacies  as markets become more competitive.  The presence of a
separate regulator in monopoly and duopoly markets also seems to have  some negative
effect on the growth of mobiles, but the effect  is not statistically significant.  This could
be because the incidence of competition-related  intricacies and the chances of a
regulatory capture are low in such markets.
Second, evidence  of pre-emptive behavior is found in competitive  sequential
entries.  The coefficient of the pre-emptive dummy suggests that the incumbent  mobile
operator increases  its subscriber size by 38 percent just in the year prior to the actual
entry of a second mobile operator.  This result is consistent with the threat of competition
argument.  On the other hand, no significant evidence is found to support  differences
between simultaneous  and sequential  entries.  In sequential competitive entries, the major
effect of competition on mobile growth occurs after the actual  year of entry.  Other
studies reported  inconsistent results on competitive  mode of entries:  Gruber and
Verboven (2000)  found sequential entry to be more effective  in their global mobile
communications study while Gruber (2001)  found simultaneous  entry to be more
effective in his CEE study.
Third, digitalization is positive and significant.  The coefficient of the
digitalization dummy suggests that the speed of mobile diffusion accelerates  as countries
adopt a digital technology.  Gruber and Verboven (2000) also found digitalization to be
positive and significant in their EU study.  However,  Gruber and Verboven (1999) and
Gruber (2001)  did not find digitalization  to have an appreciable  impact on the diffusion
of mobiles . Our finding is consistent with the finding of the EU market study which  is
also dominated by the GSM standard.
26Fourth, the presence of an incumbent-owned cellular is negative and significant,
suggesting that the involvement of the incumbent fixed-line operator in mobile operations
slows down the growth of mobile telecommunications.  This is consistent with the theory
of an abuse of a dominant position, and with the dismal performance record of African
incumbent fixed-line operators.  Privatization of the incumbent fixed-line operator is;
however, positive and significant, suggesting that privatization accelerates mobile
growth.  Further analysis  indicates that it is the privatization of the incumbent fixed-line
operator that is involved in cellular, not just the privatization of the incumbent per  se, that
accelerates  the growth of mobiles.  This is also consistent with the notion that
privatization improvers performance. Therefore, while the presence of an incumbent-
owned cellular decelerates mobile growth, the privatization of an incumbent fixed-line
operator that is involved in cellular mitigates that negative effect.
Finally, urbanization  (as measured by the % of urban population)  and main lines
are positive and significant; the rest of the country characteristics  variables,  such as
income and population,  are not significant.  The positive significance of the urbanization
variable  suggests that mobile services in Africa are mainly concentrated  in urban centers.
Similarly,  the positive significance of the main lines variable suggests that mobiles are
perceived as complements to fixed lines; alternatively,  it also suggests the presence of
positive network externalities from the fixed network.  The fact that urbanization  and
main lines are positive and significant are consistent with each other, and both indicate
that mobiles are following the footsteps of the incumbent fixed-line operators  which
don't have much presence in rural areas.
Furthermore,  as far as the relationship  between mobiles and fixed lines is
concerned,  findings from other studies suggest that mobiles are perceived as substitutes
for fixed lines in developed  markets, such as the EU, while they are perceived as
complements to fixed lines in relatively less developed markets,  such as Central and
Eastern Europe.  Interestingly, the coefficient of the main lines parameter in our study is
consistent with these findings, i.e. mobiles in Africa are perceived as complements, at
least at this stage,  to fixed lines.
27All of the above  findings have relevant policy implications,  and it is my hope that
telecommunications  policy makers in Africa can learn important lessons from this study.
In the future,  it is interesting to explore how competition,  regulatory qualities, investor
qualities, and other policy variables  affect prices, access to the poor and qualities of
services. It will also be interesting to consider regulatory and investor quality measures,
which we have not included in this study because of the paucity of data, in future mobile
diffusion studies.  Also, one may want to model the mobile diffusion problem using the
logistic model, which is widely used in diffusion studies, as a sensitivity analysis to the
results found in this study.  The author of this paper has plans to explore these issues.
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30Table 2: The Estimation Results of Equation One
Dependent variable:  LN (# of  Mobile Subscribers)
I  II
Number of operators  0.474 *  0.424
(4.12)  (3.64)
Separate regulator  0.103  0.098
(0.59)  (0.57)
Incumbent-Owned  Cellular  -1.426  *  -1.390
(-3.65)  (-3.58)
Privatization  0.604  *  0.621 *
(2.59)  (2.68)
Digitalization  0.563 *
(3.13) 
GSM  0.681 *
(3.73)
% of urban population  0.087 **  0.085
(2.17)  (2.14)
LN (Main lines)  1.007 *  0.941
(3.24)  (3.04)
LN (Population)  0.661  1.372
(0.20)  (0.42)
LN (GDP per capita)  0.780  0.876
(0.73)  (0.82)
Time trend  0.016  *  0.015
(4.12)  (3.96)
Country fixed-effects  (average)
Adj. R  0.89  0.89
F-stat  257  262
Number of countries  41  41
Total observations  279  279
Note: t-stats in parentheses.
*Significant at  1%  significance  level.
*-  Significant at 2% significance level.
**Significant at 5% significance  level.
***Significant  at  10% significance level.
31Table 3: The Estimation Results of Equation  Two
Dependent variable: LN (# of Mobile Subscribers)
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X
Monopoly  market  -1.132 *  -1.558
(-6.42)  (-6.20)
Duopoly  market  1.132  ^  1.558 *  1.203 -
(6.42)  (6.20)  (6.90)
Triopoly  market  -O 281  -1.098 '-  0.851  0 460  0.928
(-I  237)  (-2.56)  (3.41)  (1.20)  (3.77)
Competitive  1.077  1.254  0.952  1.079
(6.31)  (5.64)  (5.52)  (6.35)
Separate Regulator  0 006  0.138  0030  -0.534"'  0 030  0.165  0001  0052  0.125  -0.007
(0.039)  (O  70)  (O 18)  (-1.86)  (O 18)  (O  84)  (O  1)  (0.31)  (O 74)  (-O  04)
Separate Regulator  0.699
Monopoly  (2.18)
Separate Regulator  -0.699
Duopoly  (-2.18)  _
Separate Regulator  *  1.057  0 358
Triopoly  (2.29)  (0.89)
Separate Regulator  -0  343
Competitive  (-1.24)
Incumnbent-Ownied  Cellular  -1.441  -1.318  -1.380  -1.148  -1.380  -1.148 *  -1.847 *  -1.464 *  -0.832'-  -1.443
(IOC)  (-3.92)  (-3.47)  (-3.73)  (-3.00)  (-3.73)  (-3.00)  (-4.71)  (-3.95)  (-2.43)  (-3.93)
Incumbent OC *  1.209-
Pnvatization  (3.17) 
Privatization  0.670  0.696 *  0700 *  0.705 *  0.700 '  0.705 *  -0079  0.508  0.773  0.665'
(3.02)  (3.13)  (3.14)  (3.18)  (3.14)  (318)_  (-0,24)  (2 23)  (3.41)  (3.01)
Digitalization  0.474 *  0.498  0.513 *  0.547 *  0.513 *  0.547 *  0.502 *  0.531 *  0.604 *  0.471-
(2.78)  (2.91)  (2.97)  (3.18)  (2.97)  (3.18)  (2.96)  (3.13)  (3.51)  (2.78)
Simultaneous entry (-I)  1.509
_9_(3.sn
Pre-emptive  0.324 ''
(1.95)
Sequential entry (0)  0.997 *
(4.85)
Sequential  entry (-1)  1.423
(5.82)_  _ _  _ _
%  of urban population  0.112'  0.112-  0.116*  0.113  0.116  0.113  0.113-  0.133  0.129-  0.111
(2.89)  2.8  (297)  (2.92)  (2.97)  (2.92)  (2.96)  (3.38)  (3.24)  (2.88)
LN (Main lines)  1.159 *  1.123  1.164 *  1.035  1.164 *  1.035 *  1.216  1.136 *  1.198
(3.88)  5  (3.90)  3.45)  (3.90)  (3-45)  (4.15)  (3.84)  (4.57)
LN (Population)  1.004  1 100  1.320  1 990  1  320  1 990  0 886  1.375  5.058  02854
(O  32)  (O  35)  (O  42)  (O  64)  (O  42)  (O  64)  (O  29)  (O  44)  (1.67)  (  )
LN (GDP per capita)  0 288  0 449  0  107  0.630  0.107  0 630  0 489  0 372  2.182
(0.28)  (043)  (0.10)  (O  60)  (0. 10)  (O  60)  (o 40)  (O  36)  (2.34)
Time trend  0.014 *  0013 *  0.013 *  0.012  0.013  0.012 *  0.013  0.011 *  0.012  0.014 -
(3.62)  (3.57)  (3.45)  (3.31)  (3.51)  (2.89)  (3 23)  (3.81)
Country fixed-effects
(average)
Adj.  R-  0 90  0.90  0 90  0 90  0 90  0.90  0 90  0.90  0.91  0 92
F-stat  284  256  256  218  256  218  243  219  299  320
Numberofcountries  41  41  41  441  1  41  41  41  41  41
Total observations  279  279  279  279  279  279  279  279  279  279
Note: t-stats in parentheses
*Significant at  1% significance  level.
*-Significant  at 2%  significance  level.
**Significant at 5%  significance level.
***Significant at 10%  significance level.
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